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ABSTRACT 
 
This study empirically examines the pattern of physical infrastructure that would unlock the 
productive potential of sub-Saharan Africa. The estimations were carried out in a panel of 21 
selected sub-Saharan African countries over the period 2000 to 2010 using the two-stage least 
squares (TSLS) estimation techniques. The infrastructure variable was constructed on the basis of 
three physical infrastructure stocks (roads, telecommunication and electricity) using the principal 
component analysis (PCA), and governance was measured using the worldwide governance 
indicators. The results conform to the findings of existing literature; namely, that real output, 
government capital expenditure, external balance and inflation are significant determinants of 
physical infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. The distinctive feature of the study is the significant 
role played by governance in explaining physical infrastructure. The results from the panel 
estimations reveal that investment in governance/institutional structures is a necessary first step in 
providing quality infrastructure stock and, hence, pro-poor, long-term economic growth for the 
region. Therefore, in modelling physical infrastructure, it is imperative to incorporate the 
important role played by governance.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
nfrastructural development, in effect, sets the foundation for broad-based sustainable long-term economic 
growth and development. Quality infrastructure facilities create conducive socioeconomic environment in 
which private sector initiatives can be boosted. Therefore, in the process of eradicating global poverty, an 
efficient stock of physical infrastructure is required and should be one of the core objectives of government in 
developing and low-income countries. The improvement in infrastructure will not only boost growth in the 
economy, but will also increase the level of productivity, which is an important ingredient in economic 
development.  
 
 Supporting infrastructure investment in Africa, as outlined in Kandiero (2009), is one of the most crucial 
catalysts for achieving the developmental goals; but infrastructure deficits have been the major constraint on growth 
in many African economies. Although the continent has been projected to be one of the fastest-growing continents 
in the world, with over 5% average growth per annum over the medium term, this could be even higher if the 
backlog of infrastructure deficits were removed. Currently, about 40% of the sub-Saharan African population lacks 
access to safe water, 60% lacks basic sanitation, 30% of the rural population has access to all-season roads and 30% 
of the total population has access to electricity (Kandiero, 2009).  
 
 Given the strong evidence – both in the literature and in real life – of the enormous role that infrastructure 
plays in achieving pro-poor, long-term economic growth, it is imperative to delve into the factors that drive 
infrastructure. The literature has identified major macroeconomic variables as being responsible for the level of 
infrastructure development (Bourque, 1985, and Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue, 2006). Macroeconomic 
stability, level of economic activity, government capital expenditure and resource endowment are among the major 
                                                 
1 The first draft of this paper has been published in the conference proceedings of the 2nd Annual International Conference on 
Micro and Macro Economics, 2012. Please note that Substantial modifications have been made to the paper. 
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macro determinants of infrastructure previously investigated. However, the role of governance/institutions in 
influencing physical infrastructure has not been thoroughly investigated in the literature. According to Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), the quality of institutions – as a determinant – overrides any other factors that drive 
the economy. These authors found that the quality of institutions has a more positive and significant effect on 
economic performance than geography and trade integration. 
 
 This study, however, augments the existing literature on the determinants of infrastructure in the context of 
the sub-Saharan African countries and investigates the important role of governance in explaining physical 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. An infrastructure variable was constructed, based on the three infrastructure 
stocks of (i) roads, (ii) telecommunication and (iii) electricity, which distinguishes it from the single-infrastructure 
stock commonly used in the literature. On the other hand, the concept of governance used in this study comprises the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which those in 
authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999).  
 
 Firstly, in line with Kaufmann et al (1999), governance is broadly defined as the process of selecting, 
monitoring and replacing those in authority and is represented by “voice and accountability”, while “political 
instability and violence” includes a measure of the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in 
choosing their leaders and the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilised or overthrown by 
possibly unconstitutional or violent means. Secondly, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies combines the perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence and independence of the civil service from political pressures, incidence of market-
unfriendly policies (such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision), as well as the burden of excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. Lastly, the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions represents “the rule of law and control of corruption”, 
and includes a measure of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society and the 
exercise of public power for private gains.     
 
 Against this background, the results of the estimates are significant and consistent with theoretical 
expectation, revealing the important role that governance is playing in physical infrastructure development in sub-
Saharan Africa. Hence, the analysis tends to shed light on the direction that policy makers should take to improve 
the level of governance in the region.  
 
 The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the importance of governance 
in infrastructure, while Section 3 describes the methodology used and the measures of infrastructure and 
governance. It also provides the description of the data used in the study. Section 4 presents the stylised facts, which 
also reveal the technical relationship that exists between governance and infrastructure. In Section 5, the empirical 
analysis and estimation results are presented, and Section 6 concludes the study.    
 
2. RELEVANCE OF GOVERNANCE IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT:  A REVIEW 
 
 Governance plays a significant role in the development process of any economy and, to an even greater 
extent, in the development of infrastructure. It is central to major development outcomes and, therefore, weak 
governance can have an enormously negative impact on returns on infrastructure investment (Kenny, 2007). The 
link between governance, infrastructure and economic development has continued to gain recognition in the context 
of global policy making. Over the past three decades, the concept of governance has risen from obscurity to 
exhortation status (Dixit, 2009). According to EconLit, the word “governance” was mentioned only five times in 
1970, whereas by 2008 it was mentioned 33,177 times. This development has brought an awareness to the literature 
that the established fundamental economic theories cannot work effectively in an economic environment where 
governance is weak. The concept of governance can be seen from two different angles: economic governance and 
corporate governance, which are often used interchangeably. Economic governance, as defined by Dixit, is the 
structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and transactions by 
protecting property rights, enforcing contracts and taking collective action to provide physical and organisational 
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infrastructure. Dixit regards this kind of governance as the more important of the two, since markets and economic 
activity cannot function well in its absence.  
 
 Good governance remains the pillar of poverty-reduction strategies prescribed by major international 
development institutions (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank and the United Nations) in recent 
times. In the process of eliminating poverty, infrastructure development remains a key and, therefore, an appropriate 
institutional and policy framework (good governance) is needed to achieve the desired objective. A region’s 
infrastructural development largely depends on its institutional strength and diversity. It is the socioeconomic 
climate created by the institutions that will improve infrastructure and will serve as a medium for more trade and 
investment (De, 2010). Diversity of political systems and institutional cultures has also been recognised by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) as the strategic priority in eliminating poverty. The ADB defines four aspects of 
sound governance – accountability, participation, predictability and transparency – which are applicable to all 
countries (ADB, 2009).  
 
 In this milieu, there is an urgent need to invest in improving governance and the institutional environment 
in order to achieve the desired level of infrastructural development that will lead to sustainable long-term growth 
and development. Kuroda, Kawai and Nangia (2007: 253) stressed that the strong need for planning and 
coordination of cross-border infrastructure requires a systematic institutional arrangement.  
 
 Emphasis on governance of infrastructure as the catalyst for developing economies to escape poverty has 
been increasing steadily over the years. The importance of good governance was highlighted in the World Bank’s 
1994 World Development Report on infrastructure, which tackled a range of issues, including public and private 
roles in provision and regulation and management of state-owned enterprises. Over the last two decades there has 
been a considerable change in the delivery of infrastructure, especially in developing countries. There has been a 
shift from state-owned to private-owned enterprises – where more stable institutions are in place – but this has not 
totally eradicated the institutional weaknesses underlying poor provision of infrastructure (Kenny, 2007). This 
indicates that, regardless of ownership, good governance remains the key to infrastructural development.  
 
 The societal cost of corruption (an element of governance) in infrastructural provision remains a huge 
constraint on economic development. Kenny (2007) refers to corruption as a symptom of failed governance, which 
can act to further weaken the governance environment. According to Kenny, corruption practices not only raise the 
price of infrastructure, but can also reduce the quality of and economic returns on infrastructure investment. 
Estimates regarding the cost of corruption in infrastructure suggest that 5-20% of construction costs are being lost to 
bribe payments, and as much as 20-30% of electricity is being stolen by consumers in collusion with staff (Gulati 
and Rao, 2006). Assuming the 5% costs, the financial burden would translate to about US$18 billion a year in 
developing countries (Kenny, 2009). To reduce corruption and strengthen the governance environment, Kolstad and 
Wiig (2009) have suggested transparency as the key factor. 
 
 Optimal regional infrastructure cannot be achieved without adequate regulation and institution 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2009). Therefore, good governance is 
essential for achieving a flawless Africa. Despite the multidimensional nature of governance, this study attempts to 
test the hypothesis of whether good governance translates into improved infrastructure. But before that can be done, 
we need to consider how governance and infrastructure are measured.   
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 A panel data econometric technique was used in estimating the empirical relationship between governance 
and infrastructure within 21 cross-sectional data points of selected sub-Saharan African countries over the period 
2000-2010.
2
 The two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation technique was adopted to account for endogeneity of the 
variables. The model and its specifications are discussed in section 5 of this paper. The data used have been obtained 
from the World Bank, the African Development Indicators and the Worldwide Governance Indicator database.    
                                                 
2 The list of countries used in this paper is presented in Appendix B. Other sub-Saharan African countries were excluded from the 
estimation mainly because of non-availability of data for some variables over the entire period.   
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3.1. Measuring Governance 
 
 The worldwide governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al (1999) were utilised in this study as a 
measure of governance. These represent the components of governance and institutions that are most influential for 
infrastructure development. The indices cover a broad range of policy and institutional outcomes for a large number 
of countries and include the rule of law, corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, and political instability. These indices are also employed in De (2010) as a measure of governance. 
In order to capture governance in a broader context, the average value of the six elements in the governance 
indicators is used as a measure of governance. The governance scores range from -2.5 to +2.5, with -2.5 representing 
the worst governance and +2.5 the best governance. Most of the governance scores for sub-Saharan African – and 
developing –countries remain in the negative range. 
 
3.2. Measuring Infrastructure 
 
 In this study, infrastructure is represented by a composite physical infrastructure index (PII), which is based 
on three infrastructure stocks of (i) roads, (ii) telecommunication and (iii) electricity. Empirical literature on the link 
between infrastructure and economic development has been plagued by single-infrastructure stock (Calderon, 2009). 
The measure of telephone penetration and electricity generation has been used widely in the literature as a proxy for 
infrastructure (Easterly, 2001, and Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón, 2005). This approach may not be able to 
produce a robust estimated impact of infrastructure on economic growth, given the high degree of correlation that 
exists among the different measures of infrastructure stocks. To avoid this shortcoming, Calderon and Servin’s 
(2004) approach was adopted in building an aggregate index that combines the three infrastructure stocks. In 
addition, the aggregation of the infrastructure stocks will help to reduce the measurement error associated with a 
single-infrastructure indicator.   
 
 It is evident that many of the variations in a particular infrastructure stock across countries are explained by 
differences in countries’ geographic and demographic characteristics (Calderon and Servin, 2004). Therefore, the 
first step in constructing the PII is to take the residuals from the regression of a particular infrastructural stock.
3
 
Estimates from the regression are satisfactory and are similar to the findings of Calderon and Servin. Each 
infrastructural stock is measured as total road network per 1000 km, electricity generation per 1,000 people and 
number of telephone (mainline & mobile phone) subscribers per 1,000 people. 
 
 The residual series derived from each regression is aggregated using the principal component analysis 
(PCA). The PCA is a process of taking high-dimension sets of indicators and transforming them into new indices 
that capture information on a different dimension and are mutually uncorrelated. To derive an aggregated index for 
infrastructure stocks, the first eigenvectors (loading matrix) from the principal component analysis were used as the 
required weights, such that the linear combination is as follows: 
 
332211 XaXaXaPII   (1) 
 
where 321 ,&, aaa  are the eigenvector (weights) from the PCA and 321 ,&, XXX  are the three synthetic 
infrastructure stocks.
4
 Appendix A shows the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the PCA.   
 
                                                 
3 Each infrastructural stock (roads, telecommunication and electricity) is regressed on the labour force, urbanisation ratio and land 
area.  
4  Smith (2002) suggests the use of the first principal component (largest eigenvalues) as the required weights. In line with Calderon 
(2009), the PCA is based on the correlation matrix rather than the covariance matrix.   
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4. GOVERNANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE:  CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
 
 The cross-country analysis presented in this section is based on the constructed governance and 
infrastructure index mentioned in Section 3. Figures 1 & 2 present a global ranking of the ten best and worst-
performing countries, based on the governance indicator (GI), while Table 1 presents the ranking for the SSA 
countries. A similar comparison is presented based on the infrastructure index (Tables 2 and 3).  
 
 
Figure 1:  Global Ranks of Top 10 Countries in Governance Index (GI) 
Source: Worldwide governance indicators and author’s own calculations. 
No. of countries: 2010 = 210; 2000 = 196 
 
 
Figure 2:  Global Ranks of Lowest 10 Countries in Governance Index (GI) 
Source: Worldwide governance indicators and author’s own calculations. 
No. of countries: 2010 = 210; 2000 = 196 
 
 With the exception of New Zealand and Canada, the top ten countries with good governance continued to 
be led by European countries. This composition has remained the same, except for Norway and Liechtenstein, which 
were ranked 11
th
 and 18
th
, respectively, in 2000. It is noticeable that there is stiff competition among the top-
performing countries to maintain their positions, whereas the ten lowest countries have shown no improvement in 
governance since 2000; most worrying of all, they are mostly SSA countries.  
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 There have been mixed performances of the SSA countries in GI over the years. Despite some 
improvement in rankings and scores, many SSA countries are still operating at a poor level of governance (Table 1). 
Not much variation exists in governance rankings among SSA countries, as most fall at the lower end of the global 
ranking. However, a country’s improvement in governance ranking may not necessarily translate into improvement 
in governance scores. For instance, Seychelles’s ranking improved between 2000 and 2010, but it has recorded a 
decline in its governance scores. Similarly, Cameroon has improved in its governance scores, but its ranking has 
deteriorated.  
 
Table 1:  Global Ranks of Sub-Saharan African Countries in Governance Index (GI) 
Country 2010 2000 Country 2010 2000 
Mauritius 54* (↑) 42 Niger 162 140 
Botswana 62 47 Sierra Leone 158* (↑) 186 
Cape Verde 68 (↑) 57 Kenya 159* (↑) 152 
Namibia 75* (↑) 76 Cameroon 174* 159 
South Africa 78 63 Liberia 166* (↑) 192 
Ghana 89* (↑) 94 Togo 175 156 
Seychelles 87 (↑) 74 Angola 184* (↑) 191 
Lesotho 105* (↑) 98 Ethiopia 179 160 
Mozambique 113* (↑) 115 Guinea-Bissau 185 166 
Benin 119 91 Congo 183* (↑) 182 
Tanzania 125* (↑) 132 Comoros 182* (↑) 170 
Burkina Faso 117* (↑) 109 Burundi 190* (↑) 188 
Zambia 127* (↑) 128 Nigeria 191 168 
Senegal 134 96 Cote d'Ivoire 193 164 
Malawi 114* (↑) 113 Equatorial Guinea 195* (↑) 183 
Sao Tome And Principe 130 89 Central African Republic 198 177 
Mali 135 114 Eritrea 202 144 
Rwanda 111* (↑) 180 Guinea 196 176 
Gambia 141 117 Chad 200 161 
Swaziland 140* (↑) 138 Sudan 206 187 
Madagascar 164 102 Congo, Dem. Rep. 207* (↑) 194 
Gabon 149 102 Zimbabwe 204 178 
Uganda 152* (↑) 146 Somalia 210 196 
Source: Worldwide governance indicators and author’s own calculations. 
No. of countries: 2010 = 210; 2000 = 196. (↑) means improvement in ranks and * means improvement in scores between 2000 and 
2010.  
 
 Empirical evidence has shown that investment in physical infrastructure, such as roads, electricity and 
telecommunication, requires a sufficiently long-term and significantly large intra-generational resource transfer. 
Regional infrastructural development, in its strictest form, can be seen as a catalyst for crowding-in private 
investment, and the absence of these facilities in an economy may result in lower productive efficiency (Munnell, 
1990).   
 
 Table 2 presents global rankings of the best- and worst-performing countries based on the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) global infrastructure rankings. These rankings were used to check the relative robustness of the PII, as 
presented in Table 3.
5
  
 
 Interestingly, the 2010 WEF rankings on infrastructure revealed the strong link between physical 
infrastructure development and economic development, as the developed economies occupied the top 10 positions 
while the developing and less-developed economies are at the bottom 10 of the 133 countries surveyed. Most SSA 
countries are at the bottom of the rankings, with Nigeria, Chad Republic and Angola showing a significant 
deterioration in infrastructure quality.  
 
                                                 
5 Owing to lack of available time series on infrastructure index from the WEF, the paper could not estimate infrastructure 
determinants based on the WEF index.    
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Table 2:  Global Rankings of Countries in Infrastructure 
Top 10 Countries Rank = 2010 Bottom 10 Countries  Rank = 2010 
Switzerland  1 Bangladesh  130 
Hong Kong  2 Chad 131 
Singapore 3 Lebanon  132 
France  4 Nepal  133 
Iceland 5 Nigeria  134 
Austria  6 Paraguay 135 
Sweden  7 Romania 136 
Finland 8 Mongolia 137 
Germany 9 Angola 138 
Denmark 10 Bosnia 139 
Source:  World Economic Forum 
 
 From the selected 21 SSA countries, the infrastructure index rankings, in terms of the PII between 2000 and 
2010, revealed a relatively good standing and significant improvement in the Southern African countries compared 
with other regions on the continent (Table 3). This positive development can also be aligned with the relatively good 
economic conditions in this region. In comparison, the PII is largely consistent with the WEF rankings, despite the 
fact that the former measures quantity while the latter measures quality.  
 
Table 3:  Rankings of SSA Countries in Infrastructure, Based on the PII and WEF 
Country 2010 PII 2000 PII 2010 WEF 
Botswana 1 2 3 
South Africa 2 5 2 
Togo 3 8 N/A 
Congo 4 10 N/A 
Ethiopia 5 15 8 
Namibia 6 13 1 
Gabon 7 6 N/A 
Cote d'Ivoire 8 3 4 
Cameroon 9 17 12 
Kenya 10 19 7 
Zimbabwe 11 1 9 
Angola 12 18 16 
Zambia 13 12 10 
Ghana 14 7 6 
Sudan 15 9 N/A 
Mozambique 16 14 13 
Nigeria 17 20 15 
Benin 18 11 11 
Tanzania 19 16 14 
Senegal 20 4 5 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 21 21 N/A 
Source:  World Economic Forum (WEF) and author’s own calculations. 
PII rankings are based on the 21 selected SSA countries and WEF rankings are based on the 25 SSA countries included in the 
WEF survey (i.e., the first to the last SSA countries’ ranks).  
 
 The scatter plot of PII and governance suggest a strong positive association between the two variables 
(Figure 3). This implies that countries with better governance have also enjoyed higher stock of infrastructure. Most 
elements of governance have partial correlation coefficients in the high range of 0.6 and 0.8.
6
 Correlation with the 
average governance index (GI) stood at 0.77. Therefore, if there is a causal relationship between infrastructure and 
governance, it must be positive.    
 
                                                 
6 De (2010) estimates among Asian countries, ranging from 0.6 to 0.9.  
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Figure 3:  Scatter Plot of Infrastructure and Governance 
Source:  Author’s own calculations 
 
Table 4:  Pairwise Granger Causality Test for Infrastructure, GDP and Governance 
Null hypothesis F-statistic P-value 
Infrastructure does not granger-cause GDP 1.05469 0.37848 
GDP does not granger-cause infrastructure 1.00514 0.39483 
Governance indicator does not granger-cause infrastructure 0.55058 0.59051 
Infrastructure does not granger-cause governance 4.15535 0.04253 
Source:  Author’s own calculations 
 
 To test whether the lags of a particular variable enter into the equation for another variable, a Granger 
causality test is necessary (Enders, 2004). Table 4 presents the Granger causality test for PII, GDP and governance 
with a lag over the period between 2000 and 2010. From the result, it is impossible to accept the null hypothesis that 
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infrastructure and GDP do not influence each other. This again confirms the evidence established in the literature; 
namely, that there is a dual causal relationship between infrastructure and GDP. Looking at the causality between 
governance and infrastructure, here, too, it is impossible to accept the null hypothesis that governance does not 
affect the performances of infrastructure. Therefore, in addition to the positive correlation between governance and 
infrastructure, it is expected that improved governance will help countries attain higher levels of infrastructure 
development.      
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS:  DETERMINANTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 The empirical strategy applied in this study is based on estimation of a simple equation relating 
infrastructure and governance, while controlling for other exogenous factors in a panel data setting. The estimated 
equation adopted in this study draws from De (2010) and Bourque (1985).  
 
 In this study, physical infrastructure was determined by a country’s economic size, government 
expenditure, international demand, inflation rate and level of governance. Therefore, to test the hypothesised 
determinants of physical infrastructure, the following equation was modelled: 
 
ititititititit egovebgcegdppii  654321 infln_ln_ln_ln_    (2) 
 
where  
pii = physical infrastructure index 
gdp = gross domestic product 
gce = government capital expenditure 
eb = external balance 
inf = inflation 
gov = governance index         
and ite  is the error term. The subscript  it  refers to country and time period respectively. All variables are 
presented in their natural logarithm forms, except for external balance and governance index, which have negative 
values.  
 
 The specification of the model reveals a possible simultaneity problem among the regressors, which has 
rendered the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) to be inappropriate in the estimations. In order to derive robust 
estimates of the parameters in equation 2, a two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation method was adopted and the 
lag values of the dependent and independent variables were used as instruments to remove the simultaneity problem 
that exists among the regressors. In addition, country-specific characteristics were considered in the estimation, 
assuming that, although these sub-Saharan African countries have similar economic structures, there are still major 
differences in the stock of regional infrastructure and their structure of governance. Given this fact, the study carried 
out the TSLS with fixed-effect estimation techniques and added an interactive dummy variable as an instrument to 
capture the huge physical infrastructure differences that exist between South Africa and other SSA economies.   
 
 The gross domestic product – a measure of a country’s economic size – is expected to pose a positive 
relationship with infrastructure, as evidenced in the literature. Therefore, an increase in economic activity will create 
an opportunity for improvements in physical infrastructure; likewise, an increase in infrastructure will lead to higher 
economic activity, as shown in Table 4.  
 
 In this context, the provision of physical infrastructure can be viewed as a major responsibility of 
government.  Therefore, government budget allocations towards more capital expenditure will go a long way in 
improving infrastructure capacity in the economy. Bourque (1985) postulates an infrastructure gap, which addresses 
the central question of why government capital outlays have failed to keep pace with the growing needs of society. 
Bourque explained that capital outlays have been crowded out by competing demands for public funds, particularly 
spending for expanding government social service programmes. This has led policy makers to change the 
expenditure mix in favour of social services, thus crowding out physical infrastructure development. However, it is 
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expected that an increasing government capital expenditure will play a significantly positive role in the long-term 
infrastructure equation. 
 
 Macroeconomic stability, as evidenced in the literature, has also played an important role in infrastructure 
building (Bourque, 1985, and Hammami et al, 2006). An unstable macroeconomic environment will have a 
distortionary effect on infrastructure development, as the real value of expenditure on infrastructure may decline. 
More investment in infrastructure is more prevalent in countries with credible, predictable and stable 
macroeconomic conditions.  This is reflected in the level of inflation. 
 
 External balance is reflected in trade flows (exports and imports). De (2010) found that trade openness 
(integration) has a positive impact on infrastructure. He defines openness as the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP. The use of external balance – the difference between exports and imports – is also expected to 
capture the performance of infrastructure. This means that countries with greater exogenous or external resources 
(aid or oil) should be in a better position to improve their infrastructure capability. Given that Africa has a huge 
natural resource endowment and is the recipient of much aid, external balance is better placed to explain 
infrastructure than trade openness.   
 
 The governance measure, as explained earlier, is expected to have a positive impact on the level of physical 
infrastructure. Therefore, an increased level of governance represents better governance, which will eventually 
increase infrastructure stock.      
 
 Against this background, the results of the estimations are presented in Table 5. In order to see the effects 
of the various elements of governance used in the study, seven equations were estimated. Each equation controls for 
the existing macroeconomic variables, but is augmented with governance. In addition, the results are robust, with R-
square coefficients ranging from 0.72 to 0.87 across the seven equations.   
 
 All the macroeconomic variables are found to be statistically and economically significant determinants of 
infrastructure, except for government capital expenditure in some of the equations, where there is statistical 
insignificance. The results (equation 1) show that a 1% increase in GDP will lead to an increase of about 0.2% in the 
level of infrastructure. This will lead to an increase of about 0.1% when government capital expenditure is increased 
by 1%. The economic significance of the external balance variable may be ambiguous, as the result translates into a 
US$1 billion increase in net resources, which is expected to boost the level of infrastructure by about 0.02% among 
the selected sub-Saharan African countries. An improvement in the level of macroeconomic stability (lower 
inflation) by 1% will lead to an increase of about 0.2% in infrastructure. 
 
 Looking at the effects of governance on infrastructure development, the overall average governance 
indicator (equation 1) is found to have a strong impact when all other macroeconomic variables have been controlled 
for. A unit increase in the average level of governance (better governance) will lead to a rise of about 0.5% in the 
stock of regional infrastructure. This again indicates that good quality institutions will overrule all other criteria 
needed to achieve desired developmental objectives (Rodrik et al, 2004). 
 
 Equations 2 to 7 reflect the results of the specific elements of governance considered in the study. The 
effects of the six elements of governance on infrastructure development are also found to be significant, except for 
the rule of law (equation 7), which does not conform (negative sign) to theoretical expectation. This could be 
attributed to its weaker linkage to physical infrastructure stock than all other elements of governance.  In other 
words, the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions (rule of 
law) will have a more indirect impact on infrastructure stock, rather than a direct impact.  
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Table 5:  Estimation Results 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
GDP 0.2*** 
(3.00) 
0.2** 
(1.98) 
0.12*** 
(2.77) 
0.1* 
(2.09) 
0.2*** 
(5.05) 
0.24*** 
(7.22) 
0.4*** 
(3.65) 
Government capital 
expenditure 
0.1*** 
(4.60) 
0.2*** 
(3.47) 
0.1*** 
(3.54) 
0.02 
(0.88) 
0.1*** 
(3.67) 
0.01 
(0.36) 
0.15*** 
(3.37) 
External balance 1.68E-11*** 
(7.81) 
1.75E-
11*** 
(9.36) 
1.36E-
11*** 
(5.14) 
1.97E-
11*** 
(7.50) 
1.73E-
11*** 
(9.68) 
2.06E-
11*** 
(6.34) 
1.99E-
11*** 
(7.58) 
Inflation -0.21*** 
(-6.47) 
-0.31*** 
(5.77) 
-0.15*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.21*** 
(4.53) 
-0.1* 
(-2.59) 
-0.36*** 
(-5.43) 
Average governance  0.5*** 
(5.80) 
      
Political instability  0.15*** 
(2.74) 
     
Corruption control   0.41*** 
(11.07) 
    
Government 
effectiveness 
   0.57*** 
(9.28) 
   
Voice and 
accountability 
    0.21*** 
(4.65) 
  
Regulatory quality      0.41*** 
(8.25) 
 
Rule of law       -0.44** 
(-2.84) 
Constant -5.11*** 
(-2.97) 
-6.50*** 
(-4.37) 
-3.69*** 
(-3.70) 
-2.33*** 
(-3.54) 
-5.55*** 
(-7.45) 
-4.84*** 
(-8.79) 
-10.56*** 
(-6.84) 
Number of 
observations 
231 231 231 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.73 0.72 0.78 0.87 0.72 0.82 0.74 
Source:  Author’s own calculations 
 
 A stable political environment will have a positive impact on the stock of infrastructure in the region. Many 
sub-Saharan African countries have been experiencing deteriorating physical infrastructure facilities and vandalism 
because of the frequent political unrest in the region. Consequently, a more stable political environment (unit 
increase in political instability) will result into an increase in physical infrastructure by about 0.15% (equation 2). 
The indicator for the control of corruption revealed a stronger impact on infrastructure, with an increase of about 
0.41% when corruption decreases by a unit (equation 3). The level of corruption in the economy – especially in the 
public sector – will directly affect infrastructure expenditure. Corrupt practices have been a major setback for rapid 
infrastructure development in sub-Saharan Africa, as most allocations to this component of expenditure end up in 
the pockets of private individuals; and even when these funds are channelled properly, poor-quality infrastructure 
stock is erected.  
 
 The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies will also be directly 
reflected in its ability to provide adequate infrastructure facilities to its citizens. Therefore, a more effective 
government, including high-quality service delivery and minimal bureaucracy, is expected to provide better-quality 
infrastructure. From equation 4, a unit increase in government effectiveness will lead to an increase of about 0.57% 
in infrastructure, while voice and accountability – the process of selecting, monitoring and replacing those in 
authorities – will exact an increase of about 0.2% in infrastructure. Sound and strict regulatory control will increase 
infrastructure by about 0.41%.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 The aim of this study was to empirically examine the development of physical infrastructure in 21 selected 
sub-Saharan African countries. The estimations performed (after controlling for other macroeconomic factors) 
portrayed a robust estimate of the parameters in the models. The stylised facts presented on infrastructure and 
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governance revealed that an improvement in governance will have a direct and positive impact on the region’s 
infrastructure stock. Countries with better governance ratings have also been able to provide good-quality 
infrastructure stock.   
 
 The results of the study confirm that the macroeconomic variables (real output, government capital 
expenditure, external balance and inflation) are significant determinants of physical infrastructure in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This corroborates the existing literature. 
 
 The distinctive feature of this study was the significant role played by governance in explaining the stock of 
physical infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. The results of the panel estimations revealed that a more stable 
socioeconomic and political environment, a corruption-free society, an effective public service, a sound regulatory 
environment and a transparent leadership structure will all boost infrastructure and, hence, create an economic 
environment that will attract the inflow of direct investment. This suggests that investment in 
governance/institutional structures themselves is a necessary first step in attaining pro-poor long-term economic 
growth for the region.  
 
 These results have critical policy implications if broad-based, job-inclusive economic growth is to be 
achieved in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, there is an urgent need to refocus the government’s role on certain 
critical areas of the economy. Government institutions need to be strengthened by improving coordination within 
government structures, and the political environment must become more stable in order to attract higher levels of 
private investment. The maintenance of public order, the assurance of property rights, a sound regulatory structure, 
the creation of a framework that will increase the provision of public goods and services and the maintenance of 
infrastructure are all urgent if the set developmental objectives are to be achieved. 
 
 Moreover, infrastructure remains the greatest challenge to the continent’s development (Brixiova, 
Mutambatsere, Ambert, and Etienne, 2011). According to estimates from Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 
(AICD), the continent needs about a $93 billion investment in infrastructure per annum in order to achieve its 
development target; only half of this amount is available. The recent emergence of public–private partnerships could 
help to reduce the investment deficits, but these can be achieved only if better governance structures are established 
in the region.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Principal Components Analysis    
      
      
Eigenvalues: (sum = 3, average = 1)   
    Cumulative Cumulative 
Number Value    Difference Proportion value proportion 
      
      
1 1.475194 0.507926 0.4917 1.475194 0.4917 
2 0.967268 0.409730 0.3224 2.442462 0.8142 
3 0.557538 ---     0.1858 3.000000 1.0000 
      
      
Eigenvectors (loadings):     
      
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3     
      
      
Electricity 0.276095 0.953500 -0.120873   
Roads -0.668537 0.280873 0.688599   
Telecommunication 0.690529 -0.109311 0.714997   
      
      
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
List of Countries 
Botswana Angola 
South Africa Zambia 
Togo Ghana 
Congo Sudan 
Ethiopia Mozambique 
Namibia Nigeria 
Gabon Benin 
Cote d'Ivoire Tanzania 
Cameroon Senegal 
Kenya Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Zimbabwe  
 
